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DYSON LECTURE
Nonhuman Rights to Personhood
STEVEN M. WISE

I.

INTRODUCTION

Thank you all for joining us for the second Dyson Lecture of
2012. We were very lucky to have a first Dyson Lecture, and we
will have an even more successful lecture this time. We have a
very distinguished person I will talk about in just a second.
I’m David Cassuto, a Pace Law School professor. I teach
among other things, Animal Law, and that is why I am very
familiar with Professor Wise’s work.
I want to say a few words about the Dyson Lecture. The
Dyson Distinguished Lecture was endowed in 1982 by a gift from
the Dyson Foundation, which was made possible through the
generosity of the late Charles Dyson, a 1930 graduate, trustee,
and long-time benefactor of Pace University. The principle aim of
the Dyson Lecture is to encourage and make possible scholarly
legal contributions of high quality in furtherance of Pace Law
School’s educational mission and that is very much what we are
going to have today.
Charles Dyson was born in August of 1909 and died at the
age of 87 in March of 1997. He was well known as a financier,
entrepreneur, and philanthropist. He was considered a pioneer
in the field of leveraged buyouts, but was best known for his
government service. After graduating from Pace Institute–as it
was known–in 1930, he began a career in public accounting.
Doctor Dyson was a lifelong Democrat who worked for President
Franklin D. Roosevelt and served in World War II. In 1954, he
founded the Dyson Kissner-Moran Corporation, a New York
investment company that has become one of the nation’s largest
privately held corporations. Pace University’s Dyson College of
1278
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Arts and Sciences is named in his honor. We are very fortunate
to have this lecture series, and we are very fortunate to have with
us today Steven Wise.
He will be talking about the Nonhuman Rights Project,
which is a very important development in the field of animal law.
Steven Wise is one of the biggest reasons there is such a thing as
animal law. When I first came to animal law, I was looking for
things to read and learn so that I could teach the field. What I
found were Steve’s books. They were my foundational education
in animal law. As I got a little more experienced, I had a few
ideas I thought were my own. When I returned to Steve’s
writing, I found they were his ideas too. But Steven is not just a
thinker, he is a teacher. He is a professor at God-knows-howmany law schools, where he teaches animal rights jurisprudence.
And he is also a lawyer. He has been active for thirty plus years
in litigating animal law cases. Now he is poised to litigate a new
kind of animal law case, through his Nonhuman Rights Project.
He is doing some of the most important and interesting work in
this field and this is one of the most important and interesting
fields out there. It is so important there is a documentary film
being made about Steven Wise’s work with the Nonhuman Rights
Project by the legendary filmmaker, D. A. Pennebaker and his
wife and partner, Chris Hegedus. Folks of a certain age,
including me, will remember Pennebaker’s film about Bob Dylan,
“Don’t Look Back,” as well as many others. This lecture is being
live-tweeted by a reporter for wired.com on wired science and
being webcast all over the world. So please join me in welcoming
Steve Wise.
II. DYSON KEYNOTE SPEAKER: STEVEN M. WISE
I was delighted to receive this invitation to speak. It seemed
as if I was just here at Pace. I looked back and saw that it was in
the winter of 1985. I must have given a really good talk because
twenty-seven years later you have asked me back. I have already
looked at my calendar and I figure 2039?
David Cassuto: It is a date.
Steven Wise: I am booked for April though. It is going to
have to be May, 2039. Call me.
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I want to speak to you about the Nonhuman Rights Project.
It is something, as David hinted, I have been working on for
twenty-five years. There are now, around the country and around
the world, some sixty volunteers and staff working on this project.
It is something we could only do in the 21st century. We often do
not meet each other in person. We Skype, have conferences calls,
email, and occasionally fly to various cities and meet in small
groups.
It is remarkable how much we accomplish by
communicating in a virtual way.
I am an “animal slave lawyer.” I have been practicing
“animal slave law” for thirty-five years. I do not want to practice
“animal slave law” anymore; I want to practice “animal rights
law.” When I teach, I do not teach “animal slave law,” I teach
“animal rights jurisprudence.” This jurisprudence does not yet
exist; it is a jurisprudence that is struggling to come into
existence.
Let me draw this pyramid to help explain what the
Nonhuman Rights Project is doing. One reason I developed this
pyramid–I wrote about it in a Lewis and Clark Animal Law
Review article a year and a half ago–was law students were
telling me they wanted to write an article about “standing” for
animals and, could I help them. I would respond that there is no
“standing” problem to write about. Nonhuman animals have
many legal problems; standing is not one. I decided to write
about it so others can understand what we are doing.
When I litigate cases as an “animal slave lawyer” in the
interests of nonhuman animals, I am not litigating “animal
rights” cases; for nonhuman animals have no rights–they lack
legal personhood. They are invisible to the civil law the way a
human slave was once invisible in the United States before the
passage of the Thirteenth Amendment and in England, before the
famous Somerset v. Stewart case was decided in 1772, an event so
important I wrote a book about it.
To help explain the importance of legal personhood to my
classes on “Animal Rights Jurisprudence,” I draw an “Animal
Rights Pyramid” with four horizontal lines. It sets out four
requirements necessary for any plaintiff to vindicate a legal right.
The first and lowest level is literally and figuratively
foundational. Does a nonhuman animal or any being have the
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capacity to possess any legal right at all? This is what the
Nonhuman Rights Project is initially focusing on.
What
arguments might persuade a common law appellate court that a
nonhuman animal plaintiff is a legal person, that is, a being with
the capacity for possessing any legal right?
Imagine a legal person as an empty “rights container.” The
Nonhuman Rights Project is preparing litigation intended to
persuade a common law high court that a nonhuman animal, like
a human, is a legal person–a “rights container”–an entity with
the capacity for legal rights. In a few minutes, I will get to the
arguments that support a finding of Level One legal capacity.
Once a court agrees with them, we move up to Level Two legal
rights.
As Level One asks whether a plaintiff has the capacity to
possess any legal right, Level Two asks to what rights is she then
entitled? I ask my students to imagine they are holding a pitcher
filled with rights, ready to be dripped into the “rights container”–
our nonhuman animal plaintiff–and which was determined in
Level One. We must justify each right we drip into our
“container” to a court.
Once we have dripped in as many rights as a court will agree
with, the Third Level asks: does our plaintiff have the private
right to assert her cause of action? The cases the Nonhuman
Rights Project is considering will assert common law causes of
action that do give private rights of action.
We reach Level Four, the top of the pyramid. Level Four
“standing” requires the defendant to have committed the act that
injured the plaintiff and can be redressed by the court.
“Standing” is an issue so unusual that lawyers who represent
human beings and other legal persons rarely consider it, for it
automatically exists.
What are the arguments for Level One legal capacity and
Level Two legal rights? For you gluttons for punishment, I point
to my 1998 Vermont Law Review article that had over 600
footnotes and was over 100 pages long. Eventually it dawned on
me that nobody was reading that law review article, or any of my
others. Imagine that! People do not read law review articles.
Law review articles do not catalyze social change. I thought
trade books might, and so I started writing trade books. Rattling
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the Cage, in which I argued for the legal personhood and the
fundamental rights of bodily liberty and bodily integrity for
chimpanzees and bonobos, is substantially my Vermont Law
Review article in the form of a trade book.
Drawing the Line emerged after people kept asking me,
“where do you draw the line in terms of which animals get
rights?” I went beyond exploring arguments for the legal
personhood of chimpanzees and bonobos to whether other
nonhuman animals–elephants, gorillas, orangutans, cetaceans,
parrots, corvids, and dogs–should be entitled to legal personhood
and, if so, where would one draw the line?
I had long asked myself: what is it that entitles us humans to
legal personhood? Why do we have certain fundamental rights?
Where do they come from? I had no preconceptions; I wanted to
know. I spent six years pouring through books at the Boston
University library. They took me past Hammurabi’s Code, to the
Hebrews, Greeks, and Romans, through the dawn of English
common law, all the way to now. These were not easy books and
few people ever checked them out of the library. I would leave
them protruding an inch from the stacks. When I returned in a
year or three, they would be still be sticking out that inch.
Those books helped me realize that one’s most fundamental
rights are intended to protect one’s most fundamental interests
and that, in human beings, these were bodily liberty and bodily
integrity. Bodily liberty is so important that, if you are a very
bad person, you may be punished by having your bodily liberty
taken away. Bodily integrity may even be more important. We
may not touch other humans without their consent.
Courts recognize that bodily liberty and bodily integrity are
fundamental human interests protected by fundamental human
rights. What is a sufficient condition for having fundamental
rights? Not a necessary condition, a sufficient condition? I kept
bumping into the idea of dignity. Dignity has many meanings.
But dignity in the sense of being a quality imbued with intrinsic
and incomparable value was something courts, legislators, and
international treaties embraced. As I tried to understand what
courts meant by dignity, I kept encountering the idea of
autonomy.
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We humans are, to some important extent, autonomous and
self-directed. Judges repeatedly emphasize this. If autonomy is
sufficient for fundamental human rights–and if it is not, then
what is?–it ought to be sufficient for fundamental rights of
nonhuman beings who possess it. I wrestled with defining the
minimum level of autonomy sufficient for legal personhood and
came up with what I called in Drawing the Line, “practical
autonomy.”
Practical autonomy has three elements. First, one must be
cognitively complex enough to want something. Second, one must
be able to act intentionally to achieve one’s desires. Third, one
must have a sense of self complex enough so that it matters to
whether one’s achieves one’s own goals.
Consciousness is implied in “practical autonomy.” One who
is not conscious cannot be autonomous. It is easy for me to
realize I am conscious. It is harder to prove someone else is.
Indeed I cannot prove that anyone else is conscious. But it should
be sufficient to show that the other being, whether mom or mom’s
dog, acts as I do when I am conscious. And from an evolutionary
point of view, the closer the common ancestry is between any two
beings, the more likely it is that their similar behaviors have
similar mental causes.
I am conscious.
I engage in activities that require
consciousness. If a chimpanzee acts the same way, I can
reasonably conclude she is conscious too. After all, our last
common ancestor lived about six million years ago–not long in
evolutionary time–and we have remarkably similar brains and
genes.
What are the arguments that–for example–a chimpanzee
should have Level Two rights? Two broad categories of common
law rights exist, noncomparative rights and comparative rights.
Noncomparative rights are rights to which one is entitled because
of who one is or how one is put together, without comparing her
to someone else. A liberty right is a noncomparative right, and
liberty rights are what I have been talking about today.
On the last page of Drawing the Line is a chart in which I set
out a “scale of practical autonomy” that runs from zero to 1.0 and
contains Classes One through Four. I placed my then-six year old
son Christopher in Class Four at 1.0. He was not always at 1.0.
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He was born at around zero and moved toward 1.0 as he
cognitively developed.
I gave four specific examples of Class One great apes and two
examples of cetaceans I met–or tried to–in Rattling the Cage and
Drawing the Line. I found Koko the gorilla in California, Kanzi
the bonobo in Iowa, Chantek the orangutan in Georgia, and
Washoe the chimpanzee in Washington State. I tried to visit two
Atlantic bottlenose dolphins, Ake and Phoenix, in Hawaii, but
their captor, Professor Louis Herman, refused permission.
I studied each as best I could and read everything I could find
in the scientific literature about the cognitive complexity of
typical members of their species so I could understand their
cognitive complexity.
By the way, I read science books and journals, including
Science and Nature, every week. Every animal rights lawyer
should! As lawyers we may spend significant time theorizing
about the law, but if we do not understand and cannot present
complicated scientific facts about the nonhuman animals in a way
that fact-finders understand, we will not win. To do that we must
understand who our nonhuman animal plaintiffs are.
On my chart, Class One animals run from 0.9 through 1.0.
Their autonomy is so powerful it immediately qualifies them for
designation as legal persons and entitlement to those
fundamental liberty rights that protect their fundamental
interests. These Class One animals are not just conscious, they
are self-conscious (that is they are conscious that they are
conscious), they demonstrate complex abilities to communicate,
and some or all the elements of a “theory of mind.”
Humans appear to attain self-consciousness at about
eighteen months of age, though it is hard to prove selfconsciousness in a nonhuman or in a very young human child.
The gold standard is the mirror self-recognition test Gordon
Gallup developed in 1978. He first habituated chimpanzees to
mirrors. While they were under anesthesia, he placed red dots on
their nose or ear. When they awoke, they looked into a mirror.
Would they respond to the red dots, and–if they did–would they
touch the mirror or their own faces? They touched their own
faces.
The generally-accepted explanation is they were
demonstrating visual self-recognition. They realized the red dots
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were on their own faces. For obvious reasons, it took years to
figure out how to administer a valid mirror self-recognition test to
dolphins. This feat was finally accomplished by Lori Marino,
head of the Nonhuman Rights Project’s Science Working Group,
and Diana Reiss in 2001. Five years later, Diana Reiss was a
member of a team that demonstrated a valid mirror selfrecognition test in an Asian elephant.
These are not the only complex cognitive abilities Class One
animals possess. They demonstrate complex communication
skills. I will not call what they do “language” because there is no
agreement on what “language” is, but powerful communication is
taking place. Phoenix and Ake, the Atlantic bottlenose dolphins,
understood sentences with rudimentary grammars comprised of
hand signals and whistles. Kanzi uses hundreds of abstract
lexigrams. If you speak to Kanzi in English, he understands
much of what you say. In one famous monograph, Sue SavageRumbaugh compared the linguistic capacities of seven or eight
year old Kanzi to a two and a half year old human child. Kanzi
understood more language than did the human child. If you
know a two and a half year old human child, you know they are
no dummies. Neither is Kanzi.
About age four, human children demonstrate “theory of
mind.” Theory of mind involves the ability to attribute such
mental states as beliefs, intentions, and desires to others and to
realize that others may have beliefs, desires, and intentions
different from our own. They begin to grasp that what others are
seeing or thinking may not be the same as themselves.
Theory of mind may be related to mirror neurons. Mirror
neurons fire not just when we do something, as most neurons fire,
but when we see someone else do it. Some scientists believe
mirror neurons may play a part in theory of mind, in
understanding the intentions of others, and in empathy,
imitation, and language. Chimpanzees and bonobos, and perhaps
dogs, have shown they possess elements of theory of mind, while
mirror neurons have been discovered in many animals, including
macaques.
Class Two animals fall between 0.51 and 0.89 on the scale of
practical autonomy. The closer to 0.9 they are, the stronger is the
case that they should be treated as legal persons. There are some
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extraordinary Class Two animals. One was Alex the African
Grey parrot who worked with Irene Pepperburg for over thirty
years. On the day I showed up to meet Alex at the MIT Artificial
Intelligence Lab, Irene was teaching Alex to read. Though Alex
referred to himself both expressly and implicitly, I did not place
even a being as cognitively complex as Alex in Class One because
he never passed a mirror self-recognition test. That was because
he was never given one.
At 0.50, Class Three animals are those we do not know
enough about to rationally place them in another class. From
0.49 down to zero, Class Four animals are those unlikely to
possess practical autonomy.
Some readers believe I claim that practical autonomy is a
necessary condition for legal personhood when I actually argue
that it is merely a sufficient condition. And why do I not argue
that sentience is also a sufficient condition? I do not because
common law judges will accept autonomy, but not sentience, as a
sufficient condition for legal personhood. There is a practical
problem with urging sentience as a sufficient condition for legal
personhood. Vast swaths of the animal kingdom are sentient. A
grant of legal personhood to a chimpanzee, dolphin, or elephant
on the ground of sentience could open legal personhood to billions
of nonhuman animals we eat. A court would therefore reject legal
personhood for the chimpanzee, dolphin, or elephant so as not to
open that door. One day animal rights lawyers may make the
argument that sentience is a sufficient condition for legal
personhood, but that is not where we should begin.
So much for noncomparative liberty rights. Entitlement to a
comparative right is determined by comparing you to someone
who has that right. The most important comparative right is
equality. Equality demands that likes be treated alike and
unalikes be treated unalike. I am entitled to a right as a matter
of equality because I am sufficiently similar to someone else, in a
relevant way, who possesses that right. I am not entitled to it if I
am not sufficiently similar, in a relevant way, to someone who
has it. However, because each of us is infinitely similar and
infinitely different from everyone else, when are we sufficiently
similar or dissimilar “in a relevant way?”
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This question should ring a bell for you lawyers and law
students. This problem lies at the center of the “reasoning by
analogy” that makes up much of common law adjudication.
Common law judges often feel bound by precedent, though not all
of them do, or should. As with any two beings, any two legal
cases may be infinitely alike and infinitely different. To decide
whether a precedent is sufficiently compelling, judges may try to
identify the relevant similarities and dissimilarities between the
case before them and cases that might have been decided
yesterday, last year, or five hundred years ago. There is no “right
answer.” Each judge finds her own “right” answer by filtering the
past through the vision of law she has both consciously and
unconsciously been constructing from childhood. Judges with
different visions of what law is may decide cases in very different
ways.
The comparative right of equality has several models. The
“Formal Model” is a pure equality. All classifications are
permissible and everyone who is alike must be treated alike
within each classification.
This model permits females or
Catholics to be discriminated against, so long as all females or all
Catholics are discriminated against.
Like the “Formal Model,” the “Rational Connection Model”
requires everyone who shares a relevant characteristic to be
treated alike, but it goes a step further and deems arbitrary any
action that lacks a rational connection between ends and means
so long as a classification furthers a legitimate state interest.
Thus, a race-based legislative classification would be acceptable
as a matter of equality in a state that pursues a policy of racial
segregation.
The Nonhuman Rights Project is not interested in these first
two kinds of equality; we are very interested in the “Normative
Model” of equality. This demands more than the existence of a
rational connection between ends and means. It requires that the
criteria used to decide which entities are sufficiently different to
be treated differently fit certain moral criteria.
It rejects
differentiations that burden a plaintiff in a manner that reflects
deeply personal social stereotypes that are biologically immutable
or changeable only at unacceptable personal costs, and it
prohibits classifications that consider morally irrelevant traits.
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Where will the Nonhuman Rights Project file its first suits,
based on liberty and equality? The good news is we can file suit
in any of the fifty states and the District of Columbia. The bad
news is we can file in any of the fifty states and the District of
Columbia. The Nonhuman Rights Project has spent the last four
years making that determination. We have run dozens of legal
propositions through all fifty-one jurisdictions and argued about
what we have learned and which jurisdiction might be the most
legally advantageous. We will identify our final jurisdictions
within a year.
I had an epiphany in 2008 while arguing before the Vermont
Supreme Court. In that case, I claimed that my client, whose
cats had died allegedly through veterinary malpractice, should be
able to sue for such noneconomic damages as loss of
companionship and emotional distress. In the middle of oral
argument, I realized I was involved in a conspiracy with the
judges to pretend their decision would be made on strictly legal
grounds, when we all knew–but no one acknowledged–that it
would not. The Nonhuman Rights Project’s Sociology Working
Group and Predictive Analytics Working Groups were formed to
address this problem.
We have therefore spent a great deal of time not just looking
at the law, but looking at the kinds of judges who will be making
the law.
We do not want to encounter justices who are
instinctively hostile to what we are trying to accomplish, and we
do not want to encounter justices who view the common law as
rigid and cramped.
One reason I wrote Though the Heavens May Fall was to
show how a great common law judge decides important cases.
Lord Mansfield may have been the greatest judge who ever spoke
English. Why did he free James Somerset and implicitly abolish
English slavery? Lord Mansfield took no cramped view of the
common law; as a great common law judge, he thought the
common law was forever working itself pure. Great common law
judges understand that the common law is a flexible living
organism that changes as morality changes and scientific facts
and experiences accrue. That is why the Nonhuman Rights
Project will use the common law to persuade judges that our
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nonhuman animal plaintiff should be entitled to legal personhood
and certain fundamental rights.
Common law judges divide into two large categories. There
are formal judges, and there are substantive judges. Formal
Judges understand justice furthers legal stability and certainty;
they look to the past, believe the answers to judicial questions are
found in law libraries or on Westlaw or Lexis, and feel bound by
precedent, even though different Formal Judges may weigh
precedent in different ways.
A “Precedent Rules” kind of formal judge understands that
justice is the following of those narrow rules precedents set.
English judges are often “Precedent Rules” Judges. In a 1913
case, the Judicial House of Lords even ruled it lacked power to
overrule itself, and so it remained until 1965. This is why
English law review articles may appear obsessed with
determining what is the holding of a case and what is dicta. Lord
Mansfield’s inferior replacement, Lord Kenyon, was a classic
“Precedent Rules Judge.” “By my industry I can discover what
my predecessors have done, and I will servilely tread in their
footsteps,” he wrote.
At the other end of the formal spectrum, “Precedent
Principle” Judges also see justice as embodying certainty and
stability, but view precedents as enunciating binding, such broad
principles as liberty and equality–not merely narrow rules.
Substantive Judges, on the other hand, do not look
backwards. “Substantive Principle” Judges see the job of justice
as doing “right,” while “Substantive Policy” Judges see justice as
doing “good.” Substantive Judges may care little, or not at all,
about what a law library contains. They value experience,
morality, and changing scientific knowledge.
“Substantive
Principle” Judges and “Precedent Principle” Judges may often
rule in similar ways, because they accept the same principles,
though for different reasons. The Nonhuman Rights Project is
seeking “Precedent Principle” Judges and “Substantive Principle”
Judges who share the principles that will lead to legal personhood
and fundamental rights for at least some nonhuman animals.
In other words, the Nonhuman Rights Project is seeking
common law judges who act like a Lord Mansfield, and who see
themselves as partners with Legislatures in their responsibility
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for law and justice. These judges are subordinate in the sense
that, if what judges say conflicts with what Legislatures say, the
Legislatures will prevail. But the common law flourishes in the
interstices of statutes and in the spaces that legislatures do not
fill. In those spaces, common law judges have a co-equal
responsibility with Legislatures to do justice. The Nonhuman
Rights Project is not seeking high court judges who will abdicate
their sacred duty as common law judges and say, “if you have a
problem, take it to the legislature.” We are looking for judges
who embrace their solemn co-equal duty to do justice.
I am not saying, in absolute terms, that either Formal or
Substantive Judges are right or wrong. But the Nonhuman
Rights Project understands that, if we want to persuade judges to
extend or change the law to allow for the legal personhood of any
nonhuman animal, Precedent Rules Judges will not be open to
our pleas, and Substantive Policy Judges may not either. These
are judges our opponents desire.
Our Sociology Working Group has identified every known
sociological characteristic that academic research has correlated
with how a judge rules. Does gender matter, religion, economic
status, race, where they went to law school, their career before
they were judges, their previous experience with nonhuman
animals, or what? How do judges decide?
Our Predictive Analytics Working Group is involved in the
long and complex task of developing algorithms that might assist
us in better understanding how a judge might rule based upon
her judicial writings. Thanks to the work of these two Working
Groups, the Nonhuman Rights Project will have some idea of the
values of the judges before whom we argue.
So a couple hundred people have spent 30,000 hours
preparing for the cases the Nonhuman Rights Project will file in
2013. Whether we win these early cases or lose them, we will
press forward, but the time to declare the legal personhood of
nonhuman animals has arrived.
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